By Terence Jandroep, CRA, CQA, CLA Certified Risk Auditor & Forensic Integrity Specialist

In the specialized field of Forensic Integrity Auditing (FIA) and preemptive risk analysis, we often identify vulnerabilities within systems that are not merely technical, but behavioral. One of the most corrosive structural risks to fiscal integrity emerged in the late 1980s and has since solidified into a systemic crisis: the transition of government tax inspectors into private independent consultancy.

To protect the sanctity of the public treasury and the objectivity of the audit process, we must address this "revolving door" not as a career move, but as a fundamental breach of state security.

The Genesis of Insider Advantage (Post-1980s)
Since the late 1980s, the complexity of global tax codes and the digitalization of audit trails created a premium on "inside knowledge." During this era, a pattern emerged where high-level officials began migrating to the private sector, selling the very blueprints they helped draft.

As a Certified Risk Auditor, I view this through the lens of Information Asymmetry. When a former inspector enters the private sector, they are not just providing legal advice; they are providing a map of the government's internal "blind spots."

A Case of Government Spionage
The term "consultancy" often acts as a polite veneer for what is effectively Government espionage. When a former official leverages their tenure for private gain, they engage in several high-risk activities:

• Systemic Mapping: They possess intimate knowledge of the "Risk Selection" algorithms used by tax authorities. This allows clients to structure transactions that intentionally bypass the triggers for a formal audit.
• Protocol Extraction: They carry confidential administrative benchmarks and internal "settlement ranges" that were never intended for public or commercial dissemination.
• The "Shadow" Influence: By maintaining social and professional ties with active inspectors, these consultants can exert psychological pressure or gain unauthorized intelligence on the progress of ongoing fiscal litigation.

 The Risk to Audit Integrity
From a forensic perspective, the presence of a former insider on the "defense" side of a tax dispute compromises the Forensic Integrity Audit (FIA).

1. Technical Manipulation: They understand the specific software vulnerabilities and data-entry shortcuts used by government staff, allowing them to "sanitize" records in a way that an external auditor might miss.
2. Erosion of Public Trust: When the public perceives that a tax inspector is simply "auditioning" for a lucrative private role while still on the state payroll, the moral authority of the tax office evaporates.
3. Conflict of Interest: There is an inherent risk that active inspectors may be less rigorous when auditing a firm represented by their former supervisor or colleague, fearing future professional repercussions or hoping for a similar "exit" path.

The Professional Mandate: A Call for a Permanent Ban

In the interest of ISO 9001 standards and the principles of preemptive risk containment, the solution is clear. We must implement a mandatory ban or, at minimum, a stringent ten-year "cooling-off" period for former inspectors.

The fiscal frontier cannot be defended if the guards are allowed to sell the keys to the gate. To restore integrity to our regional financial systems from Aruba to Sint Maarten we must recognize that the tools of the state belong to the public, not to the highest bidder in the private consultancy market. It is time to treat the "revolving door" as the National security threat it truly is.

Washington, D.C./ WILLEMSTAD CURACAO:--- The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has called for deeper transparency reforms at the Centrale Bank van Curaçao en Sint Maarten (CBCS), warning that while the institution has made “significant progress,” key gaps in governance, communication, and public accountability still remain.

The findings come in the IMF’s latest Central Bank Transparency Code Review, which evaluates how effectively the CBCS communicates its policies, operations, and decision-making to the public and stakeholders.

Strong Progress, But Trust Still Recovering

The IMF acknowledged that the CBCS has taken meaningful steps in recent years to rebuild credibility after past financial sector failures that eroded public trust. Enhanced communication efforts, regulatory reforms, and modernization initiatives have helped restore confidence.

The report highlights that transparency is now central to the bank’s strategy, particularly as it operates across two countries—Curaçao and Sint Maarten—within a shared monetary union.

Notably, stakeholders have recognized improvements in communication, with over three-quarters reporting better transparency compared to previous years.

Transparency Strengths: Monetary Policy and Communication Gains

The IMF praised the CBCS for its high level of transparency in key policy areas, especially:

• Monetary policy framework and objectives
• Foreign exchange (FX) reserve management
• Lender of last resort (LOLR) operations

The bank’s communication surrounding the launch of the Caribbean Guilder in 2025 was cited as a standout example, with effective messaging reaching a wide audience.

Additionally, the introduction of new reports—such as the Financial Stability Report—and increased use of newsletters and multilingual communication have strengthened public engagement.

Key Concerns: Governance, Communication, and Accountability Gaps

Despite progress, the IMF identified several structural weaknesses:

1. Weak Transparency in Governance

The report notes that while legal frameworks and mandates are publicly available, they are not sufficiently clear or comprehensive.

• The hierarchy of the bank’s objectives is not clearly defined
• Responsibilities of decision-making bodies lack transparency
• Internal governance structures are not fully disclosed

This makes it difficult for stakeholders to fully understand how decisions are made.

2. Limited Disclosure of Government Interactions

The IMF raised concerns about minimal transparency in relations between the central bank and governments.

• Little public information exists on agreements with public institutions
• Parliamentary engagement is irregular and largely informal

The Fund suggested that regular reporting to both national parliaments would strengthen accountability and public trust.

3. Communication Strategy Needs Strengthening

Although communication has improved, challenges remain:

• Messaging is not always accessible to all stakeholders
• Website usability issues limit access to information
• Some audiences—particularly in Sint Maarten—feel underserved

The IMF recommended publishing a formal communication strategy and simplifying technical content for broader understanding.

4. Gaps in Policy Transparency (FX and AML/CFT)

The report identified insufficient clarity in foreign exchange policies, particularly:

• Lack of explanation of licensing rules
• Limited disclosure of policy outcomes and rationale

Similarly, transparency around anti-money laundering (AML/CFT) supervision is uneven, with internal controls and enforcement outcomes largely undisclosed.

Major Recommendations

The IMF outlined a comprehensive reform agenda, including:

• Clarifying the legal framework and institutional autonomy
• Publishing governance structures, committee roles, and decision processes
• Improving risk disclosure and internal audit transparency
• Enhancing engagement with parliaments and public institutions
• Publishing a formal communication strategy
• Increasing transparency in FX policies and AML/CFT supervision

A Complex Operating Environment

The CBCS operates in a unique and challenging context as the central bank of a two-country monetary union. The financial system it oversees is large—exceeding 300% of GDP—and includes banks, insurers, and pension funds.

While the system remains broadly stable, past institutional failures have underscored the importance of transparency and effective supervision.

Looking Ahead

The IMF emphasized that the review is not a ranking exercise but a tool to help central banks align with global best practices.

For the CBCS, the path forward is clear: deepen transparency, improve communication, and strengthen accountability mechanisms to sustain public trust.

“The progress is notable,” the report concludes, “but further steps are needed to ensure transparency supports both independence and credibility.”

Conclusion

The IMF’s review underscores a broader global trend: central banks are increasingly judged not only by policy outcomes, but by how clearly and openly they communicate them.

For Curaçao and Sint Maarten, strengthening transparency at the CBCS will be critical—not just for institutional credibility, but for financial stability and public confidence in the years ahead.

Click here to read IMF Report.

Willemstad/Philipsburg:---  The Centrale Bank van Curaçao en Sint Maarten (CBCS) today presents the results of the IMF’s Central Bank Transparency (CBT) Code Review. The CBT Review is an in-depth assessment designed to evaluate how openly and clearly the CBCS communicates and operates across its core responsibilities, including governance, policy development, daily operations, performance reporting, and engagement with government and stakeholders. The CBCS welcomes the recommendations received to further enhance its transparency and strengthen the CBCS’ disclosures and communication practices.
Last year the CBCS requested the CBT review, reflecting its longstanding commitment to strengthening transparency, accountability, and public trust. The review provided the CBCS with a valuable opportunity for institutional reflection. The process engaged a multidisciplinary team across several divisions of the CBCS and enabled a comprehensive assessment of the CBCS’ transparency practices, including how information is disclosed to the public. In addition, the IMF administered a digital survey and conducted in-person meetings in both Curaçao and Sint Maarten to complement the assessment with input from key stakeholders. Collectively, these elements supported the identification of areas for improvement and targeted enhancements to further strengthen transparency and accountability. As the IMF notes, transparency is an essential pillar for supporting an effective central bank and safeguarding institutional credibility.
The CBCS notes that the IMF recognizes the significant strides made in recent years to enhance openness, communication, and stakeholder engagement. In its review, the IMF highlighted substantial improvements in the CBCS’ communication practices, including more frequent publications, multilingual outreach, expanded use of digital channels, and clearer reporting on core functions. Stakeholders surveyed by the IMF also acknowledged notable progress, giving the CBCS favorable ratings for overall transparency and accessibility of information.
The IMF further commended the CBCS for its highly transparent monetary policy framework, including clear disclosure of objectives, instruments, and the rationale for the currency peg. The review also praised the CBCS’ publication of comprehensive analyses such as the Financial Stability Report, its well-defined approach to reserve management, and its consistent communication of supervisory policies, consumer protection measures, and AML/CFT guidelines.
The CBCS reviewed all recommendations and has already identified concrete actions to further enhance transparency. All actions arising from the CBT Review have been integrated into the CBCS’ Strategic Plan 2026–2028, ensuring sustained commitment in the coming years.
“This exercise reflects our firm belief that transparency is essential to maintaining trust and ensuring that the public keeps us accountable,” stated CBCS President Richard Doornbosch. “We welcome the IMF’s constructive guidance and will continue to build on the progress already made.”
The CBCS thanks the IMF Mission Team for their professional and effective guidance during the mission. The Board also extends its sincere appreciation to CBCS staff for their dedicated support throughout the review process, as well as to external stakeholders for their constructive engagement and willingness to collaborate.
The detailed Central Bank Transparency Code Review Report is available on our website: https://www.centralbank.cw/about-the-bank/governance-risk-and-compliance

Willemstad, March30, 2026
CENTRALE BANK VAN CURAÇAO EN SINT MAARTEN

PHILIPSBURG:--- In March 2026, a legal advisory prepared by Professor Arjen van Rijn was submitted to the Council of Ministers of Sint Maarten, addressing a critical constitutional issue: the role and limits of the Governor within the country’s governance system.

The advisory was prompted by a January 2026 incident involving administrative decision-making and subsequent actions that raised serious constitutional concerns. At its core, the document examines whether the Governor acted within his legal authority—or whether those actions risked undermining democratic governance.

Background: The Incident That Triggered the Advisory

The issue began with an incident on January 7, 2026, involving disciplinary action against a civil servant. The government imposed an immediate administrative measure, followed by a suspension decision that required formal approval by a national decree.

However, complications arose during the decision-making process:

• The Governor intervened in the Council of Ministers’ proceedings
• The Prime Minister and another minister were reportedly prevented from attending a meeting
• The Governor participated in deliberations with an advisory vote
• The Governor returned and delayed signing the decree, requesting further review

These actions led to confusion over authority and raised questions about whether constitutional boundaries had been crossed.

The Core Constitutional Question

The advisory focuses on a fundamental issue:

What are the legal limits of the Governor’s authority within Sint Maarten’s constitutional framework?

To answer this, the advisory examines the Governor’s dual role and the principle of ministerial responsibility.

The Dual Role of the Governor

The Governor of Sint Maarten operates in two distinct capacities:

1. Constitutional Head of Government (National Role)

In this role, the Governor:

• Represents the King within Sint Maarten
• Forms part of the government together with the ministers
• Acts formally as the head of the executive

However, crucially:

• The Governor has no independent governing authority
• All actions fall under ministerial responsibility
• Ministers—not the Governor—are politically accountable to Parliament

2. Representative of the Kingdom Government (Kingdom Role)

In this capacity, the Governor:

• Safeguards the interests of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
• Ensures compliance with Kingdom law
• May intervene if national decisions conflict with Kingdom interests

This role includes a key power:

• The ability to refuse to sign a decree and escalate it to the Kingdom government

A Fundamental Principle: No Independent Power

A central conclusion of the advisory is:

The Governor does not possess independent decision-making authority within the national government.

Instead, the Governor’s role is limited to:

• Being consulted
• Offering advice
• Providing warnings
• Encouraging reconsideration

But ultimately:

The ministers decide—and the Governor must follow.

This principle is rooted in parliamentary democracy: elected officials must hold power, not appointed representatives.

“No Third Way”: A Critical Doctrine

One of the most important legal conclusions in the advisory is the rejection of a so-called “third role” for the Governor.

The Governor can act only as:

1. Head of government (without independent power), OR
2. Kingdom representative (with escalation powers)

There is no middle ground where the Governor acts as an independent constitutional guardian with autonomous authority.

Allowing such a “third way” would:

• Undermine democratic accountability
• Blur lines of responsibility
• Concentrate unelected power in a non-political office

Historical Context: The Van der Meer Affair

The advisory draws on precedent, particularly the Van der Meer affair, which clarified that:

• The Governor may form opinions and engage in discussion
• But in case of disagreement, ministers have the final say
• The Governor must ultimately “sign at the dotted line”

This historical case reinforces the doctrine that the Governor’s authority is subordinate in national governance matters.

Assessment of the Governor’s Actions in the 2026 Case

The advisory concludes that the Governor exceeded his authority in several ways:

1. Interfering with Ministerial Participation

The Governor informed certain ministers that they could not attend a Council meeting.

• This is problematic because:
  • The Council of Ministers determines its own functioning
  • The Governor has no authority to exclude ministers

2. Participating Actively in Cabinet Deliberations

The Governor attended and engaged in discussions with an advisory vote.

• This is considered inappropriate because:
  • The Governor should remain above political decision-making
  • Active participation risks politicizing the office

3. Influencing Policy Direction

Decisions taken in meetings suggested a shift in policy direction influenced by the Governor.

• This undermines:
  • The political primacy of elected officials
  • The authority of the Prime Minister

Democratic Risks Identified

The advisory warns that such actions pose serious risks:

• Erosion of ministerial responsibility
• Weakening of democratic legitimacy
• Blurring of constitutional roles
• Potential constitutional crisis

A key insight:

The Governor is not democratically accountable, while ministers are. Therefore, the Governor must not take on a political role.

The Proper Use of Governor’s Powers

The advisory clarifies what the Governor should do in contentious situations:

1. Advise and warn ministers
2. Respect ministerial decision-making
3. If necessary, refuse to sign a decree
4. Immediately refer the matter to the Kingdom government

This ensures:

• Legal oversight without undermining democracy
• Clear accountability structures

Resolution of the Case

Eventually, after legal developments:

• A revised decree was submitted
• The Governor signed it
• The proper constitutional procedure was restored

This outcome aligned with the correct legal framework.

Final Conclusions of the Advisory

The advisory reaches a strong and unequivocal conclusion:

• The Governor’s actions exceeded constitutional limits
• They undermined the authority of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers
• They were constitutionally and democratically unacceptable

Recommendations

The advisory urges the government to:

• Clearly reaffirm constitutional boundaries
• Engage in dialogue with the Governor
• Prevent recurrence of similar situations
• Protect the primacy of democratic governance

It also warns against allowing precedents that could gradually expand the Governor’s role beyond its legal limits.

Conclusion

This advisory highlights a fundamental tension in constitutional systems that combine local autonomy with Kingdom oversight. While the Governor plays an essential role in safeguarding legal order, that role must remain strictly limited.

The key takeaway is clear:

Democratic authority must remain with elected officials.
The Governor advises, safeguards, and escalates—but does not govern.

Click here to read Professor Van Rijn's advice to Prime Minister Dr. Luc Mercelina.